

Rethinking Transit Migration in Turkey: Reality and Re-presentation in the Creation of a Migratory Phenomenon

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ABSTRACT

Discussions of transit migration in Europe and its peripheries are not simply descriptions of an existing reality, but to some extent also a part of the process of constructing that reality in such a way that discursive practices enable policy statements to conceptualise and talk about this phenomenon. The main goal of this paper is to explore this process through the politicisation of transit migration in Europe, with a particular focus on Turkey. The essay first documents the irregular and transit migration experience of Turkey in the last thirty years with the help of several data sets. It particularly emphasises that there is a reality of transit migration in Turkey, but that there also exists other forms of irregular labour migration. The paper focuses on transit migration in Europe in the next section. It draws attention to the rather ironic fact that, while most European countries have adopted a range of restrictive control systems against incoming migrant flows, especially in the wake of September 11, their economies have been able to absorb thousands of irregular migrants. An important consequence of the economisation and securitisation of the European international migratory regime has been the politicisation of transit migration, precipitating an obsession with transit migration on the peripheries of the continent. Drawing on the insights from this discussion on politicisation of transit migration, in the following section, the paper examines the way in which transit migration in Turkey has been approached in Europe in the context of the

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INTRODUCTION

At the heart of the debate on the phenomenon of transit migration is the evident case of Europe and its proximate regions. Discussions of transit migration in Europe and its peripheries are not simply descriptions of an existing reality, but to some extent are also a part of the process of constructing that reality in such a way that discursive practices enable policy statements to conceptualise and talk about such a phenomenon (Düvell, 2006a,b,c). This observation does not mean that we have to discard conventional analytical and empirical frameworks that deal with the reality of transit migration. Rather, in order to have a more informed view of this phenomenon, we need to work with theoretical abstractions and discursive de-constructions – that is, we should take a multidimensional analytical approach to the study of transit migration. At the core of these theoretical and discursive ideas lies a new aspect of the long-standing *politicisation* of the international migration system in the European Union (EU): its *securitisation* and the combination of *securitisation* with *economisation*. Thus, our core argument is that the political construction of transit migration in the European sphere should be interpreted through the intertwined processes of securitisation and economisation of international migratory regimes, which are not only becoming more

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restrictive and selective, but also more dynamic and multifaceted. This means that these international regimes are often shaped by a complex, interacting, and even conflicting mixture of security concerns (securitisation) and economic interests (economisation) in the migratory regimes of major receiving countries. It is within this context that, for instance, international migratory flows directed towards European countries seem to include a significant proportion of migrants who first came to the peripheral zones of Europe (such as Eastern Europe, Western Asia, or Northern Africa), with the intent to enter the continent from there (İçduygu, 2000; Kaytaz, 2006; Papadopoulou-Kourkoula, 2008). Turkey constitutes one of those transit zones for international migrants who intend to enter Europe.

The main goal of this paper is to explore the way in which the political construction of transit migration is associated with the processes of securitisation and economisation of international migratory regimes in Europe and its peripheries, through the case of Turkey. In doing this, our objective is to contribute to the unpacking of the notion of transit migration, by emphasising the connections between this notion and political preoccupations in Europe (Collyer *et al.*, 2012), and its blurred boundaries and mixing with other forms of irregular migration (Düvell, 2012).

The essay begins by documenting the irregular and transit migration experience of Turkey in the last 30 years, with the help of a data set on the apprehension of irregular migrants, as provided by the security forces, as well as the findings of several surveys. We show in this section that there is indeed a reality of transit migration in Turkey en route to EU countries, but that there are also other irregular migration flows such as circular labour migration, and that sometimes, transit migration and asylum seekers' flows may be entangled. The goal of the next section is to unpack the notions of transit and irregular migration in Europe by demonstrating the economisation and securitisation of migration in the continent. In the following section, this investigation on the politicisation of migration in Europe helps us examine the way in which transit migration through Turkey is debated and represented. In the past decade, the implications of transit migration for Turkey's EU membership accession process have received considerable policy and

scholarly attention. Turkey has recently implemented a number of policy changes in its migratory regimes, changes that have been shaped by the dynamics and mechanisms of the Turkey-EU relationship. Through a discussion of these processes, the essay seeks to relate the phenomenon of irregular and transit migration in Turkey to the wider context of the international migratory regimes around Europe.

IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN TURKEY: COMPLEX PHENOMENA AND BLURRED CATEGORIES

Turkey has long been defined as a 'country of emigration' based on labour migration to West European countries since the early 1960s. But this label no longer accurately captures Turkey's international migration experience. Today, Turkey is also a 'country of immigration', as a result of intense migratory movements over the last two decades (İçduygu, 2003, 2006; İçduygu and Kirişci, 2009). In fact, migratory flows towards Turkey are not a new phenomenon; immigration has existed since the early years of the Republic. However, the migratory practices of these early periods followed a course substantially different from the migratory practices of recent times, both in nature and scale.

International migratory movements towards Turkey during the process of nation-state building were comprised mostly of ethnic Turks and Muslims living in neighbouring countries. In contrast to the early years of the Republic, in recent years Turkey has seen flows of migrant groups of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds and national origins migrating for various purposes. Ongoing immigration to Turkey of persons qualified as aliens has altered Turkey's position in the international migration system in Europe. Turkey's former singular position as a 'migrant-sending country' (which until recently continued due to family reunification and the flow of asylum-seekers) is now being supplemented with that of a 'migrant-receiving country'. More recently, Turkey has also become a transit country (transit zone) for migrants seeking to reach a third country. International migratory movements to Turkey since the end of the 1970s have included transit migrants, irregular migrant workers, asylum-seekers, and refugees (Kirişci, 2002a; İçduygu, 2003, 2006; Kaytaz, 2006;

Papadopoulou-Kourkoula, 2008). In addition, legal migration of professionals and retirees is also taking place.

As in other areas of the world, the intensity of the globalisation process has contributed to Turkey's transformation into a 'migrant-receiving' and 'transit' country. Thus, Turkey's international migration system, which to a large extent is an integral part of the European migratory system, has become rather complex, involving irregular migrants, transit migrants, asylum-seekers, refugees, and at times, persons of regular (legal) migrant status. In a way, several international migratory systems have come to overlap in Turkey: regular and irregular migration between the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Turkey; circular labour migration from CIS countries; and flows of transit migrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees from Iraq and Iran en route to Western Europe and North America.

Some of these migratory movements are closely related to Turkey's geographical proximity to the countries of origin, but there are other important reasons as well. Political issues and security concerns arising in neighbouring countries (e.g. Iran and Iraq) have been among the main reasons driving people to migrate to Turkey, whereas in other cases, economic collapse in the country of origin (e.g. the poorer republics of the CIS), but also a cultural affinity with Turkey (as in the case of Turkish-speaking or Muslim groups from the CIS) are the main reasons behind the migrants' choice of Turkey. Yet, while some see Turkey as their main destination country, others consider it only as a temporary station on their way to final destinations in the North and West. Turkey's position as a transit route partly derives from its geographical location at the crossroads of Asia, Europe, and Africa, but this transit position in part is also politically constructed. In the wake of EU expansion, Turkey has come to constitute both the sea and land border of the EU in the southeast. Its relatively lax migration regime, the difficulty of patrolling its rugged land borders with Iran and Iraq in the East, the history of illegal border-crossings both in the East and the Southeast (across from Syria) – these all make Turkey a prime location for transit en route to the well-protected borders of the EU.

We will examine the above-described patterns of migration to Turkey under the general rubric of irregular migration, referring to forms of

international mobility, several aspects of which are not legally regulated or documented. We will discuss irregular migration under three separate headings, based on the purpose and manner of migration as (a) transit migration, (b) shuttle or circular migration, and (c) asylum-seeker and refugee movements. Regular migration, which falls outside the scope of this paper, comprises persons who arrive in Turkey for employment or academic purposes, often with their family members, and who have the necessary residence and work permits (see Table 1). Our goal here is to emphasise that there is a reality of transit migration in Turkey, but also that we should not lose sight of other forms of irregular migration such as circular labour migration and asylum seeking.

It is a formidable task to obtain sufficient and reliable data for determining the volume and trends of irregular migratory movements. Nevertheless, there are some indicative estimates available. For example, it is possible to comment on the extent of *irregular migration* towards Turkey by evaluating the figures concerning persons apprehended on charges of irregular migration, for which data is compiled by the Bureau for Foreigners, Borders, and Asylum within the Directorate of General Security of the Ministry of the Interior. This form of migration substantially accelerated from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s. Whereas in 1995, just over 11,000 irregular migrants were apprehended, and in 1996, 19,000, this figure reached 47,000 in 1999; by 2000, it was over 94,000 (Table 1). It is likely that this increase over the course of the 1990s is partly due to the increase in the number of migrants, and partly a result of improvements in law enforcement. Starting in 2001, the number of detained irregular migrants declined: this figure, nearly 83,000 in 2002, dropped below 50,000 in the year 2005, but again rose to nearly 52,000 in 2006, and to almost 66,000 in 2008 (Table 1). Given that these figures represent only apprehended irregular migrants, it is likely that the scale of irregular migration through Turkey is in fact much higher.

Considering the countries of origin of irregular migrants,¹ we argue that those migrants apprehended on the eastern and southern borders of Turkey intended to use Turkey as a bridge to reach their destination countries in the West and North, and therefore, are most likely *transit migrants*. Based on the data available on migrants

Table 1. Selected indicative figures on immigration to Turkey, 1996–2008.

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Irregular migration	18,800	28,400	29,400	31,600	94,600	92,400	82,800	56,200	61,200	43,841	51,983	64,290	65,731
Illegal entries/departures					51,400	57,300	44,200	30,348	34,745	19,920	18,876	30,120	29,997
Overstays					43,200	35,100	38,600	25,852	26,455	23,921	33,107	34,170	35,740
Asylum applications	5,100	6,800	6,600	5,700	5,200	5,200	3,794	3,966	3,908	3,914	4,548	7,690	12,981
of which: Afghan				100	400	400	47	77	341	365	339	705	2,642
of which: Iran	1,700	2,000	3,800	3,900	3,500	3,500	2,505	3,108	2,029	1,716	2,297	1,668	2,117
of which: Iraq	3,300	4,700	2,500	1,600	1,000	1,000	974	342	964	1,047	724	3,470	6,904
Residence permits					168,100	161,254	157,670	152,203	155,500	131,594	186,586	183,757	185,715
of which: work					24,200	22,414	22,556	21,650	27,500	22,130	22,805	25,475	28,198
of which: study					24,600	23,946	21,548	21,810	15,000	25,240	24,258	22,197	24,175
of which: other					119,300	114,894	113,566	108,743	113,000	84,224	139,523	135,365	132,342

Source: Compiled by the authors from data obtained from UNHCR Ankara Office and Bureau for Foreigners, Borders, and Asylum at the Directorate of General Security of the Ministry of Interior.

detained by security forces, it can be assumed that in the beginning of the 2000s, 51,000–57,000 migrants annually intended to use Turkey as a transit country, while this figure has dropped to below 20,000 today. Most of these transit migrants enter Turkey illegally with the help of human smugglers and leave or attempt to leave Turkey using similar ways (İçduygu and Toktaş, 2005). From 1996 to 2006, almost 620,000 irregular migrants were apprehended in Turkey; nearly 52% of these seemed to be transit migrants according to the assumptions stated above (Table 1).² Over this period, the most important five source countries of migrants, mostly transit migrants, were: Iraq (114,000), Pakistan (51,000), Afghanistan (38,000), Iran (25,000), and Bangladesh (20,000) (Table 2).

A new data set compiled by the General Command of the Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard Command on irregular border-crossings since September 2006 provides us with some figures that implicitly reflect the nature of transit migration through Turkey. This new information on irregular border-crossings complements the data on apprehended irregular migrants, as elaborated above. According to this data set, approximately 48,000 foreign citizens were apprehended in the period between September 2006 and February 2007 as they violated the rules of border-crossings in Turkey: more than one-fifth were from Palestine, less than one-fifth from Iraq, more than 10% from Afghanistan, another 10% from Mauritania, 9% from Pakistan, and 7% from Somalia (Table 3). Data have indicated that nearly four-fifths of these irregular border-crosser were caught on the borders between Greece and Turkey or Bulgaria and Turkey, while they were departing; the remaining one-fifth were apprehended on the eastern borders of Turkey (mostly on the Iraqi, Iranian, and Syrian borders), while they were entering Turkey (Table 4).

Shuttle or circular migration can also be considered part of the irregular migratory flows to Turkey. By shuttle migration, we refer to the mobility of persons making multiple trips to Turkey in search of economic opportunities. In circular migration, entry into Turkey is typically legal, but visas may be overstayed. Or, some people may engage in circular movements in order to avoid overstaying their visas.

One important mode of shuttle migration is the *suitcase trade* (or shuttle trade), primarily

Table 2. Irregular migration in Turkey: apprehended cases, 1995–2006.

Country	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
Afghanistan	24	68	81	921	2,476	8,746	9,701	4,246	2,178	3,442	2,363	3,665	37,911
Azerbaijan	21	3	3	10	620	2,262	2,426	2,349	1,608	1,591	1,410	937	13,240
Bangladesh	113	322	301	2,408	1,193	3,228	1,497	1,810	1,722	3,271	1,524	2,313	19,702
Bulgaria	21	22	39	103	1,005	1,699	1,923	3,132	989	550	363	376	10,222
Georgia	37	9	9	5	809	3,300	2,693	3,115	1,826	2,294	2,348	1,989	18,434
Iran	252	362	364	1,116	5,281	6,825	3,514	2,508	1,620	1,265	1,141	972	25,220
Iraq	2,128	3,319	5,689	14,237	11,546	17,280	18,846	20,926	3,757	6,393	3,591	6,412	114,124
Moldova	19		17	5	5,098	8,312	11,454	9,611	7,728	5,728	3,462	1,575	53,009
Pakistan	708	435	307	1,798	2,650	5,027	4,829	4,813	6,258	9,396	11,001	3,508	50,730
Romania	68	12	107	36	3,395	4,500	4,883	2,674	2,785	1,785	1,274	1,013	22,532
Russian Federation	5	4	52	2	1,695	4,554	3,893	2,139	2,130	1,266	1,152	730	17,622
Turkey					2,085	3,289	5,304	6,951	5,660	3,341	2,164	2,052	30,846
Ukraine	9	4	17	4	1,715	4,527	3,451	2,874	1,947	1,341	1,335	1,004	18,228
Other	7,957	14,224	21,138	8,654	7,669	17,967	15,452	13,743	15,185	18,849	6,639	6,825	154,300
Unknown		20	315	127	292	2,998	2,499	1,934	826	716	4,074	16,606	30,407
Total	11,362	18,804	28,439	29,426	47,529	94,514	92,365	82,825	56,219	61,228	43,841	49,977	616,527

Source: Compiled by the authors from data obtained from UNHCR Ankara Office and Bureau for Foreigners, Borders, and Asylum at the Directorate of General Security of the Ministry of Interior.

Table 3. Irregular migration in Turkey: 'Illegal Border-Crossings', 2006–2008.

	September 2006–February 2008																		
	2006						2007						2008						
	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May.	June.	July.	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Total
Afghanistan	41	72	33	83	14	24	38	174	706	527	639	665	979	461	518	211	128	83	5,396
Burma										19	11	51	109	235	700	638	615	214	2,592
Iran	11	20	16	30	25	11	34	50	76	40	107	111	107	78	97	83	97	63	1,056
Iraq	294	412	246	197	144	141	182	568	540	770	1,024	1,202	1,510	611	321	373	322	124	8,981
Mauritania	73	100	104	101	48	47	29	158	233	308	352	493	647	800	1,038	233	190	90	5,044
Pakistan	17	62	16	6		81	9	275	399	337	222	430	964	1,086	479	120	127	73	4,703
Palestine	44	57	122	226	133	237	488	534	536	891	1,122	949	1,917	897	873	369	397	408	10,200
Somali	82	106	138	338	98	130	172	209	156	166	199	308	550	391	243	129	83	192	3,690
Syria	19	21	50	79	42	62	111	15	102	93	104	57	117	69	17	47	48	46	1,099
Turkish	55	54	51	53	32	75	123	94	159	118	135	98	173	75	47	54	60	54	1,510
Other	21	46	40	48	38	101	56	36	164	304	295	440	430	308	305	258	230	199	3,319
Unknown	707		1									2			2				712
Total	1,364	950	817	1,161	574	909	1,242	2,113	3,071	3,573	4,210	4,806	7,503	5,011	4,640	2,515	2,297	1,546	48,302

Source: General Command of Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard Command.

Table 4. Irregular migration in Turkey: 'illegal' border-crossings by location, 2006–2008.

Borders	Bulgaria B.		Aegean Sea		Georgia B.		Iran B.		Mixed B.		Syria B.		Greece B.	
	NE	NAP	NE	NAP	NE	NAP	NE	NAP	NE	NAP	NE	NAP	NE	NAP
Months	NE	NAP	NE	NAP	NE	NAP	NE	NAP	NE	NAP	NE	NAP	NE	NAP
Sept.06							81	1,362					81	1,362
Oct.06	2	5	2	37	1	2	14	71	2	74	21	83	28	693
Nov.06	1	5	1	29		2	13	46	2	65	17	37	26	692
Dec.06	3	10	4	73	1	1	13	42	8	156	14	49	25	842
Jan.07							11	36	3	30	15	47	22	471
Feb.07	2	2	1	5	1	1	13	131	1	9	22	130	21	635
Mar.07	4	15	1	47			9	19	2	78	18	80	30	984
Apr.07	3	11	2	46	1	1	18	139	32	1,308	10	64	27	648
May.07	4	59	5	64	1	3	16	151	42	1,787	25	95	29	1,091
June.07	7	34	10	234			16	123	30	1,804	21	88	27	1,097
July.07			7	136	1	1	13	55	31	2,540	26	108	31	1,236
Agu.07	2	8	2	29	3	6	14	171	31	2,112	28	314	44	2,211
Sept.07	1	12	7	124	2	3	20	171	32	4,923	27	203	29	1,886
Oct.07	4	8	5	165	1	1	17	109	30	3,094	28	164	30	1,303
Nov.07	1	2	6	171			12	86	31	3,027	22	104	26	1,242
Dec.07	1	2	1	19	1	1	9	45	30	1,800	22	90	28	686
Jan.08							5	54	30	1,399	22	120	26	681
Feb.08			6	135			6	8	30	1,062	14	52	22	482
T NE		35		6		13		219		448		352		471
T NAP		173		1,314		20		1,457		26,630		1,828		16,880
														48,302

Source: General Command of Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard Command.

NE, Number of Events; NAP, Number of apprehended people; T, total; B, borders.

from CIS countries. Suitcase trade is motivated by an effort to take advantage of the demand for and supply of various merchandise and cost differentials – including taxes, tariffs, and transportation – between origin and destination countries. Although it is difficult to estimate the number of suitcase traders since they enter the country on tourist visas, it is likely that hundreds of thousands of people have visited Turkey annually for this purpose since the early 1990s (Yükseker, 2004).

Another significant mode is the *circular labour migration* of people from the poorer republics of CIS as well as several Balkan countries, who arrive in Turkey on tourist visas to work informally in domestic services, the entertainment sector, sex work, construction, the tourism sector, agriculture, and garment workshops. Based on several case studies on specific groups or sectors, it is possible to say that the majority among these are women who hail from Romania, Bulgaria (Parla, 2007), Gagauzia (Keough, 2006; Eder, 2007; Kaşka, 2009), Moldova (Ünal, 2008), the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Turkmenistan. As in the case of the suitcase trade, it is difficult to estimate the number of circular labour migrants. According to the above-mentioned figures on apprehensions by security forces, the top five source countries of circular irregular migrants are: Moldova (53,000), Romania (23,000), Georgia (18,000), Ukraine (18,000), and the Russian Federation (18,000) (Table 2).

In recent years, Turkish authorities have implemented measures for regulating irregular migration; in the context of harmonising procedures with the EU, penalties for human trafficking and smuggling have been increased, and the issue of protecting the borders is now dealt with more seriously.³ As a preliminary hypothesis, one may argue that these measures have been more effective in curbing transit migration, as the apprehension figures suggest (Table 2), and less effective in stemming irregular circular labour migration. This may be partly due to the fact that labour migrants most often enter Turkey legally, unlike many transit migrants. In fact, Turkey's visa regime seems to contribute to irregular labour migration from the CIS, while it tends to prevent flows from various African and Asian countries and consequently pushes the citizens of these countries to enter the country illegally. For

instance, Turkey implements relatively liberal visa regimes to CIS countries with many of which it has significant cultural and economic relations; however, it has stricter visa requirements for many Asian, Middle Eastern, and sub-Saharan African countries (Brewer and Yüksek, 2009), partly because of the EU's pressure to combat irregular migration and partly in order to control the inflow of asylum-seekers (Kirişci, 2008). Another reason might be that, although periods of economic stagnation and intense unemployment may have made the Turkish labour and commodity markets less attractive for both suitcase traders and some circular labour migrants, in the specific case of female domestic labour, the growing demand for elder and child care in middle-class urban homes continues to be a pull factor for migration.

As discussed above, Turkey as a transit zone between Asia, Europe, and Africa has become an important stopping point, or stepping stone, not only for transit migrants, but also for many *asylum-seekers* since the 1980s. Without a doubt, the political irregularities, problems and turmoil on its periphery make Turkey's borders all the more open to entries for asylum purposes. A great majority of these asylum-seekers are citizens of Iran and Iraq. Actually, this situation constitutes a non-compliance with the geographical limitation clause notation that Turkey signed at the UN Geneva Convention of 1951. According to this limitation, Turkey would consider only asylum applications of persons from European countries.⁴ Although such a limitation is in effect, almost none of those who seek asylum in Turkey are European. Turkey's geographical limitation makes the asylum regime in the country inconvenient and causes serious criticism from the international community. As part of various measures to make its migration and asylum regimes conform to the *Acquis Communautaire*, Turkey has promised to the EU that it would eventually lift the geographical limitation. However, concerned that without this limitation it would become a 'buffer zone' (İçduygu, 2007b; Kirişci, 2008) between Western Europe and countries in political turmoil, and that hence, it would be faced with a wave of asylum-seekers, Turkish authorities have tended to oppose the abrogation of this limitation clause until and unless concrete progress towards full EU membership has taken place. Nevertheless, in practice this limitation is

Table 5. Asylum applications in Turkey, 1997–2007.

	Iranians		Iraqis		Other		Total	
	Cases	Persons	Cases	Persons	Cases	Persons	Cases	Persons
1997	746	1,392	1,275	2,939	83	117	2,104	4,448
1998	1,169	1,979	2,350	4,672	124	187	3,643	6,838
1999	2,069	3,843	1,148	2,472	184	290	3,401	6,605
2000	2,125	3,926	791	1,671	108	180	3,024	5,777
2001	1,841	3,485	497	998	372	709	2,710	5,177
2002	1,456	2,505	402	974	219	315	2,077	3,794
2003	1,715	3,092	159	342	373	514	2,247	3,948
2004	1,225	2,030	472	956	540	922	2,237	3,908
2005	1,021	1,716	490	1,047	753	1,151	2,264	3,914
2006	1,343	2,297	364	724	1,094	1,527	2,801	4,548
2007	1,024	1,668	1,738	3,470	1,651	2,502	4,413	7,640
Total	15,734	27,933	9,686	20,265	5,501	8,414	30,921	56,597

Source: Compiled by the authors from data obtained from the UNHCR Ankara Office and Bureau for Foreigners, Borders, and Asylum at the Directorate of General Security of the Ministry of Interior.

only partially implemented: in the aftermath of the influx of Kurdish refugees from Northern Iraq in 1998 and 1991, Turkey started to grant temporary asylum to non-European asylum-seekers. In cases where asylum-seekers are granted refugee status through a joint procedure of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Ministry of the Interior, the phase of re-settlement to a third country is initiated (Kirişçi, 2002b).

Asylum-seeker and refugee movements have not constituted a significant proportion of migrant inflows into Turkey over the last two decades. Between 1997 and 2007, Turkey received only 31,000 asylum applications (Table 5). While the approximate annual number of asylum-seekers towards the end of the 1990s had been 6000, by around 2005 this figure dropped to below 4000. The greatest number of asylum applications to Turkey has come from Iran and Iraq. Of the asylum applications, 46% were filed by Iranians and 44% by Iraqis. In 2000, nearly 4000 Iranians and over 1600 Iraqis sought asylum in Turkey (İçduygu and Toktaş, 2005). In 2006, asylum figures were less than 2300 for Iranians, and less than 800 for Iraqis. In 2007, with over 4400 applicants, again a notable increase was observed in the number of asylum-seekers, in particular with the arrivals of people from Iraq and several African countries; when including their family members, this number was over 7600 (Table 5). In fact, between 1997 and 2007, more

than 27,000 of the total 56,000 asylum seekers (more than 48%) were granted refugee status and re-settled in countries such as the US and Canada. This means that their situation constituted a type of 'legalised transit', in the sense that they entered illegally but eventually left Turkey legally.⁵ Several surveys indicate that the asylum application process can take several years (e.g. İçduygu, 2003; Brewer and Yüксеker, 2009). Currently, while more than 7000 refugees are waiting for resettlement, another 5000 asylum seekers are waiting for their status to be determined. This asylum procedure itself makes Turkey a transit country for those who have been granted refugee status and now wait for resettlement.

Based on the empirical evidence, one can also say that the movements of asylum-seekers and transit migrants often intermingle. A survey of African migrants in Istanbul indicated that African asylum-seekers remain in Turkey until and even after their cases are finally rejected and then attempt to illegally cross into Greece. In other words, asylum-seekers whose applications have been rejected turn into irregular transit migrants (Brewer and Yüксеker, 2009). The same survey also indicates that the blurred boundaries between transit migration and asylum-seeking are partly related to the increasing securitisation of migration regimes in Europe (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006), as we will discuss in the next section. The great majority of Somali and Mauritanian respondents to the survey reported that

they had paid human smugglers to take them to Greece or Italy by boat, but that they were left on the Turkish coast. Thus, they had not intended to come to Turkey and/or to apply for asylum; rather, they became involuntary transit migrants (Brewer and Yüксеker, 2009). On the other hand, some transit migrants and/or asylum seekers who originally intended to go to EU via Turkey may end up staying in Turkey, as a study on Iraqi, Iranian, and Maghrebi migrants demonstrates (Danış *et al.*, 2009).

As the examination of existing data sets and surveys above indicates, there is indeed transit migration in Turkey en route to EU countries. But the data indicate that there are also circular labour migrants whose final destination is not Europe. On the other hand, asylum seekers' flows are to a certain extent entangled with transit migration. In order to better understand this entanglement and the co-existence of transit and circular labour migration, we should contextualise these migratory flows within the EU context, whereby the securitisation and economisation of migration contribute to the *reality* of transit migration, and the *re-construction* of that reality.

TRANSIT MIGRATION IN EUROPE: THE QUESTIONS OF 'SECURITISATION' AND 'ECONOMISATION'

The reality as well as the *re-construction of the reality* of transit and irregular migration and asylum-seeking in Turkey should be analysed within a broader perspective. In order to do so, we want to utilise two notions mentioned at the beginning of this paper – namely, the securitisation and economisation of migration. As European immigration policies and practices in the 1990s and 2000s have increasingly been driven by both so-called selective choices of economic interests and restrictive measures of security concerns, one of the consequences of these economisation and securitisation processes for the European international migratory regime has been the politicisation of transit migration. Not only various individual European countries, but also their international or supra-national organisations have become obsessed with the notion of transit migration on the continent's peripheries. For instance, when one examines various immigration-related documents of organisations such as the Council of Europe (CoE, 2000, 2001)

the EU, particularly since Tampere, and of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM, 1996) written since the mid-1990s, one can see frequent references to the phenomenon of transit migration (Düvell, 2006a).

As discussed elsewhere (İçduygu 2007a), while thousands of transit migrants 'illegally' cross borders, or work 'informally' in the European economies, it appears that two paradoxical but complementary phenomena occur: on the one hand, in the market-driven environment on the continent, there are complementary demands between the economies in need of labour and the economies with surplus labour. As a result, then, labour flows occur from the latter to the former. On the other hand, since the material conditions of state border control and labour markets make free international migration unviable in Europe, many of these migrant labourers find that although they are unable to obtain the necessary authorisations for migration or work, they are still able to migrate to and work in these economies. When these migrants are not able to migrate directly from their own homelands to European countries, transit migration – or, in other words, step-by-step migration – often becomes a strategy to enter the targeted destination country. In short, when European national economies need labour, it seems that the status of labour in these economies – whether it is regular or irregular – becomes irrelevant; the case of southern European countries amply illustrates this tendency.

It is rather ironic that, while most European countries tend to advocate or adopt a range of restrictive control systems against incoming migrant flows, their economies are able to absorb thousands of irregular migrants. Often relying on a restrictionist rhetoric of costs rather than benefits of immigration, which precludes a rational assessment of immigration flows, these states emphasise the need for continuous, intense intervention to restrict and regulate migration flows. However, within a liberal frame of economic rationality, it appears that, as these economies start to experience labour shortages, concerns about the availability of labour in domestic markets arise; consequently, calls for immigrant labour increase. In addition to these developments, irregular migrants, often using the migration strategy of step-by-step movement, enter these countries and become indispensable to the economies. Even if they initially work without

documentation, they can sometimes become regularised.⁶ Both in public and academic debates, this picture should be supplemented by the observation that migration has not accelerated at a pace comparable to movements of trade and capital.

As migration discourses, policies, and practices in Europe over the last decades have tended to concentrate on the benefits that migrant labourers bring to different countries' economies, the subsequent economisation of national migration policies and programmes has become a widespread trend in international migration (Iredale, 1997; Hugo, 2002; Richardson *et al.*, 2002; McNamara, 2007), not only attracting skilled and temporary migrants, but also practically relying on irregular immigrants who provide these economies with cheap labour, especially in the services sector and agricultural seasonal work. This has been particularly evident in southern European countries that have strived to be regionally competitive in Europe by accepting these immigrant workers into their booming economies. In this context, irregular transit migrants serve the needs of certain sectors of European economies. However, it should be noted that, despite the wide-spread presence of various benefit-based arguments, arguments concerning the 'cost of immigration' are still prevalent in the European migration discourses and have become more visible during the economic crisis of 2008 onwards.

It is widely recognised that, initially following the collapse of the communist regimes in the early 1990s and later, in the wake of September 11, immigrants to Europe have increasingly come to be viewed as factors of insecurity in the continent's economic, social and political spheres. As noted by Ibrahim, this view 'has been possible through the broadening of the concept of security and the linking of risk and threat to migrants' (Ibrahim, 2005: 164). It is within this context that 'the process in which migration discourse shifts towards an emphasis on security' is known as the securitisation of migration. Because of its mostly irregular nature, its dynamics, which entail a state of uncertainty and insecurity, and its impact on people and societies, transit migration is perceived as posing a serious challenge to the long-standing paradigms of certainty and order in migrant-receiving countries (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002). Therefore, one of the prominent

features of this process of securitisation has been the production of a discourse of fear and proliferation of danger in reference to the potential transit migrants in neighbouring countries and regions. In fact, the securitisation of migration in Europe can be examined as a discourse that enables policy statements to address the notion of transit migration. An investigation of the discourses on transit migration in the European sphere reveals how the securitisation of the migration discourse is built upon the concept that transit migration leads to a chaotic migratory system. A very obvious manifestation of the securitisation of migration in Europe has taken a tangible form with the discussion concerning transit migration in Turkey, as it is critically questioned in the country's EU accession process.

It is for this reason that the economisation and securitisation of migration regimes in Europe should also be assessed in terms of their impact beyond EU borders. The globalisation of migration (the fact that directions and motivations of immigration and emigration are currently much more diverse than they were until the 1980s) requires us to view these twin processes from a global perspective. The number of potential migrants to the EU has risen since the 1980s, as a result of developments within the global political economy – such as the debt crisis, structural adjustment policies and ensuing unemployment, the collapse of the Soviet bloc, internal wars, and international conflicts. Yet, globalisation has also transformed the labour markets of many middle-income countries in such a way that for the first time they allow the use of migrant labour in both low-wage and high-wage sectors (e.g. domestic labour and the high-skilled labour of business experts). Processes of globalisation have also affected the EU economies; while unemployment has increased, new labour needs in both high- and low-wage sectors have emerged. It is within this context that the securitisation and economisation of the European migration regimes has taken place, as discussed above.

TRANSIT MIGRATION IN TURKEY: THE EU CONTEXT

When examining Turkey's current position within the European migration systems in the light of the discussion above, the following picture emerges: first, since the 1980s Turkey has

become a transit route for migrants and asylum-seekers uprooted because of the above-mentioned global processes. Second, the securitisation of migration has had repercussions for Turkey, in terms of channelling an increasing number of migrants who want to reach the EU to travel through or remain in Turkey. Related to this, since Turkey's candidature to union membership in 1999, the EU has demanded from Turkey to both securitise migration within its borders and conform fully to the norms of the international refugee regime. Third, irregular migration to Turkey is also economically motivated. Thus, it is possible to talk about the economisation of the migration regime in Turkey itself. On one hand, irregular labour migrants especially from CIS and Eastern European countries have circulated to fill the low-end service labour demands of the Turkish urban middle classes. On the other hand, irregular transit migrants who have to enter the Turkish informal economy in order to survive or finance their onward journey also become part of the economisation of the migration regime.

Although the reality of transit migration in Turkey emerged in the early 1980s, it was not an issue of concern in the country until the mid-1990s. In fact, in Turkey there was no discussion using the term 'transit migration' or 'transit migrants', even though there were actually thousands of migrants who came from Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq to the country with the intention of moving on to a third country. In other words, transit migration was ontologically present, but epistemologically absent. Thus, the study of transit migration in Turkey suffered from academic and public neglect in its early stages. Also, transit migration was not an area of study until it became a 'risky' reality for its final destinations in the European core countries – in particular, as noted above, until it came to be defined as a hazardous phenomenon by various international bodies, such as the EU, the CoE, and the IOM. In brief, once transit migration had been conceptualised and talked about in Europe, it also became an issue of discussion in Turkey.

Due to reasons such as the intermingling of international migration issues with the EU's economic, social and political areas of integration in general, and Turkey's significant position as a *sending country*, *receiving country*, and *transit country* (especially within the Eurocentric international migration and asylum regimes) in

particular, international migration debates have become central to Turkey–EU relations. Within this framework, one can observe that in discussions on international migration in the EU in relation to Turkey the following question is repeatedly asked: will Turkey, in its position as a transit country, be able to manage migration control at the southeast gate of Europe, and if so, to what extent, will it be able to produce and implement policies in compliance with the EU-centric international migration and asylum regimes? There is also concern as to whether, even if the accession issue is removed from the agenda, the question of how Turkey will protect the EU's south-eastern border from migration waves will remain an important item on the agenda.

Turkey and the EU started negotiations targeting full membership on 3 October 2005. In this new situation, issues of international migration are considered the key items on the agenda relating to Turkey's relations to the EU. Since then, various reports by the European Commission on Turkey have emphasised that this enlargement will be different from previous ones, frequently making references to the issue of transit migration. For instance, in the recommendation on Turkey's progress towards accession to the EU in the Commission's Statement for the European Union and European Parliament dated 6 November 2004, the following point was stated: 'in terms of Turkey, managing the new and long external borders of the EU will constitute a significant political challenge and will require large investment . . . Closer cooperation before and after the accession shall make it easier . . . to handle migration and asylum issues in addition to . . . human trafficking.'

As can be clearly observed in the discourse in Turkey's EU membership debate, the notion of transit migration and many issues associated with it have become vital for discussions regarding EU–Turkey relations. For instance, in its recommendations on Turkey's progress towards accession in early October of 2004, the European Commission noted:

' . . . with over three million, Turks constitute by far the largest group of third-country nationals legally residing in today's EU [. . .] the management of the EU's long new external borders would constitute an important policy challenge . . . managing migration and asylum as

well as fighting . . . trafficking of human beings . . . would be facilitated through closer cooperation both before and after accession'.⁸

Consequently, possible cooperation areas such as ensuring the security of the external borders of the EU, asylum, human smuggling, and human trafficking have become major issues of debate (İçduygu and Toktaş, 2003). One of the most widely debated issues in this context is the 'management of migration and asylum flows' arriving in the country, and in particular the question of how Turkey's state institutions and legal frameworks would handle the phenomenon of irregular transit migration and asylum. As elaborated elsewhere (İçduygu, 2007b), these debates have made clear that the health and stability of Turkey's integration with the EU depends not only on the economic, social, and political transformations in the country, but also on specific policy matters. The issue of 'migration management' is seen here as a component of the country's Europeanisation or 'EU-isation' process.⁹ Moreover, as the 'Europeanisation' of national immigration as well as asylum policies and practices is not only a matter of policy, but also a matter of politics, the efforts to develop this process appear to be uneven and vigorously debated (İçduygu, 2004: 93; Kirişci, 2005: 355–357). The notion of 'migration management' remains very central to Europeanisation, defined as 'processes of construction, diffusion, and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, "ways of doing things" and shared beliefs and norms to a European model of governance, caused by forms of cooperation and integration in Europe' (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004: 4). In few countries is this more evident than in Turkey, where different kinds of national immigration and asylum policies and practices are infused with historical legacies, social validity, cultural notions, and political importance, which in turn are intensely contested by the European influence.

It is undisputable that the EU process of introducing a new perception and new legal arrangements on the management of the immigration and asylum flow in Turkey plays a role in the changing climate of the migratory and asylum regimes in the country. Consequently, it is possible to make two main observations concerning the impact of the EU process on the

transformation of irregular transit immigration- and asylum-related policies and practices in Turkey. First, the ongoing discussion implies the presence of a 'positive' impact of this process on these policies and practices in Turkey. For instance, the introduction of penal codes concerning trafficking and smuggling is a good example in this context. Yet, although new legislation is welcome, the shortage of trained personnel dealing with asylum-seekers and irregular migrants as well as the inadequacy of facilities for apprehended irregular migrants raise concerns about human rights violations in detention centres. While this impact is rather moderate, at the same time it is growing, probably a reflection of the general opinion that while the EU process on the whole is for many quite positive, at the same time it is less so than expected. Second, as far as Turkey's reaction, or resistance, is concerned, the influence of the EU process on irregular transit immigration- and asylum-related policies and practices seems to vary: for instance, the impact of the EU process on some specific and practical asylum issues has been stronger in general than on a number of general and normative immigration concerns. It seems that Turkey's sceptical perspective on the Europeanisation of national immigration and asylum policies and practices is strongly linked to the question of *burden-sharing versus burden-shifting* (İçduygu, 2007b). Of course, this is again not surprising, since the whole Europeanisation process often proceeds as a top-down process originating from the core – in this case the EU – which is also often met with the resistance of a bottom-up process coming from the periphery – in this case Turkey.

From the Turkish side, indeed, there is a feeling that EU policies and practices for managing migration and the array of related restrictive measures shift the burden of controlling migration to countries on the periphery, like Turkey, with the conclusion of readmission agreements often being cited as a case in point (İçduygu, 2007b; İçduygu and Kirişci, 2009). Likewise, preventing Turkey from turning into a buffer zone between the immigrant-attracting European core and the emigrant-producing peripheral regions has been a similar area of concern for Turkish policy-makers (İçduygu, 2007b; İçduygu and Kirişci, 2009). Therefore, Turkish authorities advocate the need for burden-sharing instead of what is perceived as burden-shifting, especially

in relation to a phenomenon such as irregular transit migration or asylum, which ultimately targets various European countries. Yet, it appears that EU authorities are urging Turkey to devote more resources and energy to the management and control of migration and asylum flows across and within its borders. Of course, these demands and considerations are central to Turkey-EU relations and create many areas of concern for both sides, from security and human rights issues to economics and politics. Practically and naturally, however, the likelihood of any progress in this field is strongly linked to the negotiations between the Commission and the Turkish authorities concerning burden-sharing.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is possible to make two main observations on the accumulating scholarship on transit migration: first, there are an increasing number of inquiries into cases of transit migration; second, there is an ongoing discussion about the meaning and nature of transit migration. The former often locates the phenomenon in a migration system approach, taking it for granted in terms of its presence in a wider migratory context, while the latter usually questions whether the phenomenon is a mere re-construction of reality rather than something original in terms of its content. In other words, transit migration today is not only an ontologically recognized phenomenon, but also an epistemologically debated concept. Emphasising this problem, Düvell (2006b) has argued that 'transit migration is as much a discourse as it is a scientific concept', which in some ways for the EU constitutes a 'war cry' against countries expected to keep migrants outside the EU borders.

What we have sought to achieve in this paper is to unpack the term transit migration in the Turkish case in order to point out both its discursive and analytical aspects. First, through a discussion of existing empirical evidence on irregular migrants, we have shown on the one hand that there is a reality of transit migration in Turkey. Particularly, we have demonstrated that transit migration is only one form of irregular migration to Turkey, and that circular or shuttle migration and asylum-seeking are also significant. On the other hand, the boundaries between transit migration, other forms of irregular migration and

asylum-seeking are grey areas, rather than clear-cut demarcations. Second, in order to make sense of these blurred boundaries, we have sought to contextualise the irregular migration experience of Turkey within the context of the securitisation and economisation of European migration regimes, as well as the securitisation and economisation of Turkey's own migration regime under the EU's impact. In doing so, we have also attempted to clarify the discursive dimension of transit migration, without dismissing its reality. Specifically, the securitisation of international migration in the EU has had repercussions for Turkey, not only in terms of channelling many migrants en route to Western Europe into 'transit' through the country, but also in terms of creating a discourse about migration control in the process of Turkey's EU membership negotiations. In addition, Turkey's migration regime has also become economised alongside that of Europe, as people from CIS countries engage in circular migration in response to Turkish labour demand. Thus, Turkish visa and border control policies intend to curb the inflow of asylum-seekers and transit migration, while they also contribute to irregular labour migration.

NOTES

- (1) Here, based on the country of origin, we assume that all migrants coming from countries in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa (such as Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, and Somalia) are transit migrants who have the intention of going to third countries, while all of the migrants originating from Eastern Europe and the CIS are circular migrants who frequently come to Turkey. Various empirical studies present evidence supporting this assumption (İçduygu, 2003; Eder, 2007; Parla, 2007; Kirişci, 2008; Brewer and Yüксеker, 2009).
- (2) It should be noted that these figures pertain to the number of apprehensions; therefore, they also include repeated apprehensions of migrants.
- (3) It has been observed in the EU's 2007 Turkey Progress Report that there have been improvements regarding the issue of human trafficking in the spheres of legislation and implementation. For details, please see:

- http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/turkey_progress_reports_en.pdf.
- (4) This is partly related to the nature of the refugee problem in post-World War II Europe and partly a ramification of the anti-communist policies that Turkey adopted during the Cold War. According to these, it would grant asylum to persons arriving from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. However, the refugee flow to Turkey during this period was rather limited (less than 8000 asylum applications from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) (İçduygu, 2003).
 - (5) For a detailed elaboration of these figures, see the UNHCR Ankara Office webpage <http://www.unhcr.org.tr/MEP/index.aspx?pageId=158>.
 - (6) For instance, there were more than 4.5 million irregular immigrants who were regularised in the southern European countries in the last two decades. For a detailed analysis of these regularisation programmes, see İçduygu (2007a).
 - (7) The European Commission released a Progress Report on Turkey and a Recommendation based on the report on 6 October 2004. These documents stated that Turkey has adequately met the political criteria and recommended that Turkey's accession negotiations to the EU be initiated.
 - (8) See Commission of the European Communities, *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament*, COM (2004) 656 final, Brussels, 6.10.2004, <http://www.avrupa.info.tr/Files//Recom.pdf>.
 - (9) In a different context, on the issue of Europeanisation of civil society, Diez *et al.* (2005) refer to the notion of 'EU-isation' as a dominant form of Europeanisation in Turkey's European integration process.
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